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Directorate of Intelligence


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Afghanistan Situation Report

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28 January 1986



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
28 January 1986

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IN BRIEF PERSPECTIVE	6	•
MASOOD AND THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IN THE PANJSHER	8	25X1
Masood has developed an effective civilian support network in the Panjsher, which assists him in obtaining money, supplies, and information.		25 <b>X</b> 1
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the		
Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments on the issues raised in the publication should be directed to		25 <b>X</b> 1
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GIME PRESENCE IN HERAT	
Recent reporting from the US	Embassy in Kabul indicates
that government administrative greater than many Western obs	ve activity in Herat may be
	at
least six ministries and two offices there.	government banks have
Comment: The resistance has	
around Herat, Afghanistan's t regime's administrative units	s there probably function at
a low level. As recently as Afghan forces launched operat	
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at denying the resist which to launch attac	cks in the city, or	n the western	
pipeline, and against failed to achieve its		out the operation	1
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Comment:		r hodu of	
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military officers occ Several general officers	curred in the past	few months.	
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military officers occ Several general office were reportedly arrest plotting and espional for the insurgents wi	curred in the past sers in the Ministrated recently in Kage. Although wides thin the governmen	few months.  Ty of Defense  Abul for coup-  Spread sympathy  That and the	
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The civilian population remaining around the Panjsher Valley contributes to insurgent effectiveness by paying taxes, aiding insurgent resupply efforts, building military facilities, and providing intelligence. Civilians also present Masood with problems, however; to maintain their support he must provide protection, financial support, and attempt to convince them not to blame the guerrillas for the brutal Soviet retaliation that often follows insurgent attacks. As one of a new breed of commanders, he also takes special pains to cultivate civilian support by running an effective local administration, emphasizing Islam, and separating guerrilla bases from civilian areas. In our view, all of these measures, and his military prowess, account for his widespread popular support.  Civilian Support to Masood's Operations  Financial Support. Although the Jamiat-i-Islami Organization in Peshawar and various private western support organizations provide a significant portion of Masood's income, some Panjsher civilians also contribute to Masood's war chest.  the civilian population in the civilian population in the compared to 90-100,000 prior to Soviet invasion.	SECRET			
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Financial Support. Although the Jamiat-i-Islami Organization in Peshawar and various private western support organizations provide a significant portion of Masood's income, some Panjsher civilians also contribute to Masood's war chest.  the civilian population in the sher now numbers about 20,000 compared to 90-100,000 prior to Soviet invasion.				ess, account for
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Soviet invasion.	jsher now n	ımbers about 20,0		
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Kabul traders also provide financial support to Masood. Since the people of Kabul depend on the Salang	
Road being open for Soviet supplies. Masood has agreed	25 <b>X</b>
not to interdict all traffic travelling to Kabul and to limit his attacks to military convoys,	201
In return, Kabul merchants provide	25)
Masood with funds and information,	25>
	207
Transportation and Logistics. Civilians in the Panjsher Valley also make an important contribution to the resistance by transporting arms and supplies from Pakistan. Horses are the primary pack animals in the	25>
insurgent logistics system and a majority of families in	
the Valley provide at least one horse to ferry arms from	25
Pakistan, The Panjsher insurgents need more horses	25) 25)
than are now available and actively encourage civilians	
to raise or buy horses.	25)
Food. Panjsher Valley food production also contributes	
to the insurgent cause. The Andarab Valleywhere	
Soviet and Afghan forces are strongalso is a source of food to the insurgents of the Panisher Valley,	25)
Food production in	25)
the Panjsher Valley in 1984 was almost nonexistant, but	
output of wheat and corn was up sharply in 1985. Food supplies from the Andarab Valley will still be needed,	
but the plentiful harvest in the Panjsher Valley should	
provide the insurgents with a good reserve of food	05)
stocks and a more varied diet.	25>
Other Benefits. The presence of civilians and insurgent families has a positive effect on insurgent morale in the Panjsher Valley. Civilians also provide	
intelligence and serve as laborers to build shelters and	OEN
other facilities at newly-established bases in the Andarab side valleys,	25)
	25>
Maintaining Civilian Support	
Masood wants to prevent the remaining civilians from	25
becoming refugees in Pakistan. he pays 5,000 Arghanis (US \$40 at	25)
bazaar exchange rate) per month per family plus 200	25>
Afghanis per child to civilians deprived of a livelihood	20/
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the surrounding areas.



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